How can prison architecture affect judicial cooperation in criminal matters – the case of detention conditions

The role of prison architecture in shaping the rehabilitation prospects of the prison population and guaranteeing a human-centered approach to the prison system has gained centrality in the academic
debate and is increasingly penetrating the public and political spheres. It is increasingly clear that the design and infrastructure of detention facilities affect the experience of imprisonment, and can, on the one hand, enhance the reintegration of the incarcerated individuals into the community, or in the worst-case scenario, constitute a blatant violation of their fundamental rights. However, a less visible aspect of
this issue is its potential impact on judicial cooperation in criminal matters, especially in the context of the European Union (EU).

In its ambition to build an area of freedom, security and justice¹, the EU’s primary law outlines the legal structure and competences for the development of policies to achieve this goal. Among these policies is
judicial cooperation in criminal matters². 

The development of the European judicial cooperation system is based on the transversal principle of mutual trust and mutual recognition. These principles operate on the assumption that, despite the different national legal frameworks, there is a common denominator between the various systems. Accordingly, this common basis allows for cooperation based on trust, with refusal of such cooperation as an exception that can only occur on limited grounds.³

In the context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, this assumption includes the recognition and respect of rights, freedoms, procedural safeguards, and judicial independence. These principles allow Member States to work together without the need for full harmonisation of their laws, thereby preserving national sovereignty on these matters⁴. Thus, to ensure that this system of cooperation is effective, it is important to maintain confidence in the different national systems of the Member States.

Given this, the relationship between prison architecture and the effectiveness of judicial cooperation in criminal matters becomes clearer. Since judicial cooperation depends on a shared sense of trust in the systems of the Member States, any element that could jeopardise this trust will certainly have consequences. This is the case with detention conditions⁵, which refer to aspects such as cell space,
access to health care, sanitary conditions and others⁶. 

Notwithstanding the European Commission’s recommendation on the procedural rights of suspects and accused persons subject to pre-trial detention and on material detention conditions⁷, there is still no
binding regulation harmonising detention conditions among Member States. This results in significant disparities in detention standards within Europe⁸.

In recent years, some Member States have increasingly questioned whether the minimum conditions of detention are respected in other Member States., in particular regarding cooperation under the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)⁹. These reservations undermine the principle of mutual trust, a necessary condition of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 

The growing number of cases in the European Court of Human Rights¹⁰ concerning violations of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the grounds of poor detention conditions, – some of which involving EU Member States – has prompted some Member States to scrutinise detention conditions when assessing a request for judicial cooperation.  

Given its frequent use, the EAW¹¹ has become the main focus of case law on conditions of detention and its implications for judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The main purpose of this instrument is to establish cooperation among Member States in arresting and surrendering individuals in criminal proceedings or to serve a prison sentence. Although it is the foremost instrument of judicial cooperation in criminal matters based on the principles of mutual trust and recognition, the first cases of refusal under the EAW triggered by concerns about the material detention conditions revealed that trust is not absolute.

In the absence of legally binding minimum standards for detention conditions in the EU, article 1(3) of the Framework Decision provides the legal grounds non-execution of EAW’s based on concerns over the detention conditions, stipulating that it “shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union”. This situation has led to a significant number of refusals of EAW requests, with the most recent figures pointing to 59 refusals in 2022, 86 in 2021 and 108 in 2020¹², based on detention conditions. 

Ultimately, this led the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to take a stand on the issue, changing the paradigm of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This change came with the Court’s decision in the Aranyosi and Căldăraru case, where the Court was asked to determine whether Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision should be interpreted to mean that when there is solid evidence that detention conditions in the issuing Member State are incompatible with fundamental rights, the requested country’s judicial authority may or must refuse to execute the EAW¹³.  

When faced with this question, the Court clearly stated that mutual trust is not trust at all costs. However, it reaffirmed the exceptional nature of the refusal, establishing in this context a two-step approach to assess the real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment based on detention conditions. The first step concerns a general assessment of risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, based on “information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated”¹⁴, regarding general detention conditions in the issuing States. To this, the Court adds a second level of assessment imposing that the executing judicial authority determines if the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment is a real risk, not only in general, but more importantly in specific circumstances of the case¹⁵. This nuanced approach underscores that trust should not be unconditional and that maintaining fundamental rights is paramount.

This decision set the precedent for the subsequent number of refusals based on the material conditions of detention, and for the increasing densification of this issue in the CJEU’s case law (see, for example the ML¹⁶ and the Doranbantu¹⁷ cases). It has also propelled the development of practical tools to help authorities assess the detention conditions under the different jurisdictions, such as the Fundamental Rights Agency’s Criminal Detention Database¹⁸, validating, at a practical level, the understanding that the assessment of prison conditions is a mandatory concern of judicial authorities when executing instruments of criminal judicial cooperation. 

The link between prison architecture and judicial cooperation in criminal matters highlights a dual importance of ensuring humane detention conditions: fostering mutual trust between EU Member States and upholding the rehabilitative role of prisons. The CJEU’s evolving case law and the development of practical tools illustrate a balance between effective judicial cooperation and the protection of fundamental rights. It reflects the understanding that for an effective judicial cooperation system, it is imperative that Member States continue to prioritise the improvement of detention conditions, thereby reinforcing mutual trust and ensuring that human rights-centered principles guide the broader justice framework.